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Laurel Mei-Singh

“Don’t turn your back to the ocean,” Kaula Crawford-Kapanui warned me on a morning visit to Ka‘ena in March 2014 as we climbed down wet rocks between sets of bone-breaking waves to gather hā‘uke‘uke, brilliant purple, sun-shaped shells thick with salty meat. While we gathered, our friends “threw net” to catch mo‘i, manini, kala, and other fish in reefs they had known their whole lives. One of the fishermen, Al Sabagala, returned the first he caught, a tradition in Hawai‘i and other places where fishing is a way of life. “It’s all about the universe,” he told me, smiling. “That’s how it works, give back and expect nothing in return.”1 Throughout the day, Sabagala and his fishing partner caught a large cooler full of fish. We saw a monk seal swimming in tide pools and an eel’s head resting in a cove, its jaws wide open and the rest of its body torn off by a predator. Perhaps because of the abundant life and isolation of Ka‘ena from the parking lots, highways, and malls that shape the rest of the island of O‘ahu, people affectionately refer to Ka‘ena as “in the back.”2 As in, when I ran into Sabagala’s cousin at a takeout in Wai‘anae, he told me: “Al went fishing in the back last weekend,” indicating that Ka‘ena exists as a space somewhat outside the relentless forward motion of what capitalist developers consider “progress.”

At the same time, Ka‘ena’s landscape reflects the geographies of colonial modernity, exemplified by a 630-meter fence constructed in 2011 that wraps around the westernmost tip of the island from shoreline to shoreline. It is two meters tall with aluminum posts connected by wire mesh with caged gates for people to pass through. To get there, one walks over rocky footpaths to reach the fence, and it imposes a jarring presence amid the sand, rocks, and boundless sky. The State of Hawai‘i Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) oversaw fence construction, with the stated purpose of keeping out predators such as mice, rats, mongooses, cats, and dogs to protect wedge-tailed shearwater birds, Laysan albatrosses, and three species of endangered plants.3

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Sabagala and others who have fished at Kaʻena for generations see the fence differently: as part of a strategy to displace fishers with ancestral ties to the place to make space for tourists. Sabagala explained bitterly that the fence is meant to keep out “dog, rats, and us.” “Us” refers to lawai’a, a Hawaiian term describing people who fish who are Hawaiian as well as nonnative locals. During fence construction from November 10, 2010, to March 30, 2011, Sabagala and other fishers received $300 fines because of increased enforcement against camping in the area. In response, they joined together as the Lawai’a Action Network and successfully fought their tickets in court. William Aila, the chair of the DLNR at the time, explained that State policies have never prohibited fishing and that the citations targeted homeless people. While the fence and its related mechanisms manage the behaviors and lifestyles of fishers and people who live outside, it produces a secure space for hikers and recreational environmentalists to visit, take pictures of birds and seals, then leave.

The fence also stands as an element of a vastly militarized region fashioned by the confluence of fencing and environmental conservation. Figure 1 depicts Mākua, five miles south of Kaʻena Point, where a chain-link fence topped with barbed wire surrounds the valley that is now a military reservation. The US military displaced its residents and seized this land after the Pearl Harbor bombing. As the army previously used this land for target practice, the community group Mālama Mākua initiated a lawsuit that has prevented live-fire training since 1998. Further, to protect the over forty endangered species in the valley and ensure compliance with the Endangered Species Act, the military now funds extensive environmental conservation programs in Mākua’s surrounding mountains. Despite this fact, over four thousand acres at Mākua remain in military hands.

By analytically linking Kaʻena’s predator-proof fence to the fence surrounding Mākua Valley, I place Kaʻena’s conservation infrastructure into a genealogy of military occupation. The two fences are not linked spatially, and they differ in obvious ways: the US military encloses Mākua for war preparation, while the State of Hawai‘i constructed the fence at Kaʻena for a wildlife reserve, producing a space amenable to tourism. Nevertheless, both fences interrupt, manage, and control land-based relationships to reconsolidate and legitimize state authority in the face of powerful grassroots claims to land. Carceral conservationism describes the territorial compromise between grassroots efforts for environmental self-determination and state imperatives to control land and natural resources.

The first section of this essay, “Carceral Conservationism and the Contestation of the Kaʻena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project,” provides background
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on the project that mandated fence construction and explicates the meaning and significance of carceral conservationism. Carceral amplifies the ways the US military and Hawai‘i DLNR cast lawai‘a and homeless people as threats to the state domination of land. As a result, these institutions employ conservation measures that partition land and living space with the stated aim of resource protection while in actuality criminalizing existing populations in order to displace them. Yet such processes do not operate unidirectionally. Instead, Hawaiian mo‘olelo (stories, history) inform community activism and self-organization that shape Ka‘ena’s landscape,

Figure 1.
Island of O‘ahu. Map by Manu Mei-Singh.
revealing significant capacity to shift the structures and logics that produce carcerality. In response, carceral conservationist measures contain possibilities for noncapitalist economies and related forms of social organization.

The following section, “Genealogy of Partitions at Mākua and Ka‘ena,” uncovers the historical underpinnings of carceral conservationism at Ka‘ena. Martial law during World War II not only enclosed land where people grew food and caught fish to eat but also unfurled a security infrastructure that continues to police indigenous and nonnative local people to this day. A continuation of these security measures, carceral conservationism replaces indigenous modes of land tenure through ideological and land-based projects that facilitate militarization/war and tourism/capitalist accumulation.

The final section, “Asian Settler Colonialism and Potentialities for Solidarities between Kānaka Maoli and Nonnative Locals,” examines possibilities yielded by lawai‘a for alliances between indigenous people and nonnatives confronting dispossession from carceral conservationism. Such place-based connections established through reciprocity can inform movements against carcerality, militarization, and displacement on a global scale.

Carceral Conservationism and the Contestation of the Ka‘ena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project

On O‘ahu’s northwest tip, Ka‘ena is one of the island’s best fishing grounds. Ka‘ena is hot—in fact, it translates to “the heat”—and Ka‘ena Point sits between lava and coral stretching into the ocean and steep brown and green cliffs inland that host a US military satellite tracking station. Waialua, on the North Shore side, is a former plantation town with skyrocketing property values and bustling tourist economy because of its proximity to famed surf breaks. Wai‘anae, to the south (see fig. 1), has the highest poverty rates on the island, and 62 percent of its residents are Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander, compared with 26 percent for the rest of Hawai‘i.¹¹ Many of Hawai‘i’s middle-class residents view Wai‘anae as an undesirable place to live because of racist and classist stigmas and the impracticality of a two-hour one-way commute to Honolulu during rush hour. Wai‘anae also “pays the social and environmental price for the economic viability of the rest of the island.”¹² Military bases occupy a third of Wai‘anae’s land, and a power plant, wastewater treatment plant, and numerous dump sites mark the rest of its landscape.¹³ Today, cliff erosion and the fence obstruct vehicular passage around Ka‘ena Point.

Infrastructural transformations have shaped Ka‘ena’s history. From the 1800s to early 1900s, extended family groups lived along the coastline, and
shrines testify to prevalent fishing. William Aila is a fisherman, Hawaiian cultural practitioner, community leader, and public official who considers Ka’ena ancestral land. He shared:

In my great, great grandfather’s time, Kamakahiki Aila, he had 17 children. . . . In the 1860s–80s, the springs were still running so you could grow food naturally. . . . The fisheries out there were incredibly rich so you had your sources of protein.

Capitalist agriculture and its lubricating infrastructures brought rapid changes. In 1879 the politician and sugar tycoon Hermann Widemann established a sugar plantation in Wai’anae Valley, ten miles south of Ka’ena. While Ka’ena’s isolation, sandy landscape, and heat prevented large-scale agricultural production, the Oahu Railway and Land Company built railroad tracks in 1897 that connected Wai’anae to plantations on O’ahu’s North Shore until 1947. According to Aila, the businessman Benjamin Dillingham “quiet titled” the parcels of his family to build the railroad, subduing other claims to ownership. Such changes facilitated Hawai’i’s incorporation into global capitalism. Hawai’i’s admission to the United States as a state in 1959 spurred the Hawaii State Government Reorganization Act and establishment of the DLNR to
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manage public lands. The DLNR acquired Ka‘ena and now works to “enhance, protect, conserve and manage Hawaii’s unique and limited natural, cultural and historic resources . . . [for] the people of Hawaii nei, and its visitors, in partnership with . . . public and private sectors.” Aila served as the DLNR chair from 2010 to 2014 and oversaw fence construction. As a Waiʻanae advocate who regularly attended community meetings as a representative of the governor and as a community resident, Aila’s positionality demonstrates the multiple and competing mechanisms that contributed to fence construction at Ka‘ena. His appointment signified the power and visibility of the Hawaiian and environmental movements, as well as limitations posed by existing state formations for Hawaiian self-determination. He explained of Ka‘ena, “The parcels that my tutus (grandmothers) lived on were eventually sold to the State of Hawai‘i for a park—which I now manage.”

On borderlands between rich and poor neighborhoods, modern development and abandonment, and military and indigenous geographies, Ka‘ena could be considered an interface between colliding ideologies, lifestyles, and visions of development. My first encounter with the Ka‘ena fence was during a rainy Thanksgiving weekend that brought an unusual winterly kona storm approaching from the west. As I walked along the coastline, drizzle mixed with the rough surf, and watery grayness seemed to block access to a world just beyond the horizon. Upon reaching the tip of the island after an hour of hiking, I encountered waves colliding from east and south, forming a foamy white line jutting away from the shore. Amid this landscape, the fence resembled images of Palestine and the US–Mexico border. Even a generally supportive technical report on the fence concedes: “Given the height of the fence and the materials being used, it was expected to be a prominent feature in an otherwise open and scenic landscape.”

The Ka‘ena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project constructed the first predator-proof fence in the United States, using techniques imported from New Zealand. Made possible by partnerships between federal, State, private, and nonprofit organizations, it aims to exclude dogs, cats, mongooses, rats, and mice that prey on sea birds and their eggs and to reduce stress on plant life. The fence bends two feet beneath the Earth’s surface to prevent animals from burrowing underneath, and a hood prevents animals from climbing over. Grants totaling $772,595 funded this project, with over half from the US Fish and Wildlife Service and $285,000 from the Packard Foundation. The Hawai‘i DLNR Division of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW) received an annual grant from the US Department of Agriculture for predator control for $35,000 that will soon end. The Wildlife Society constructed the fence,
while the DLNR oversaw this task. The Hawai‘i Tourism Authority supported the project with a $50,000 contribution. The Pacific Cooperative Studies Unit, which oversees conservation efforts at nearby Mākua Military Reservation, demonstrated an active interest in the project by developing a comprehensive evaluation of its effectiveness.

The project faced numerous challenges. Questions remain regarding its necessity, as Brent Liesemeyer, who is a staff member of the DLNR DFW, explained prior to fence construction in 2009 that the population of wedgetail shearwaters “continues to grow over the years with current methods, and it would probably continue to grow without the fence.” Lawai‘a have also documented fence erosion because of metal oxidation from saltwater spray and heavy winds, and in late 2015 noted that much of the hood had fallen off and gates had become stuck open. Also, hikers sometimes bring unleashed pet dogs through the caged gates, and the fence design includes a “coastal gap” that widens during low tide and enables mammals to circumvent the fence. Further, the cost of project implementation is higher than anticipated. Last, the project has faced vigorous resistance from lawai‘a. In October 2008 four Ka‘ena lawai‘a, three Hawaiians and a non-Hawaiian, requested a contested case hearing against the cooperative agreement between the Hawai‘i Board of Land and Natural Resources (BLNR, a branch of the DLNR), the US Fish and

![Fence construction, March 2011. Photograph by Summer Mullins-Ibrahim.](image-url)
Wildlife Service, and the Wildlife Society, demanding cultural site protection. The following month, the DLNR convened the Ka‘ena Point Advisory Group (KPAG) to “advise the [DLNR] . . . through recommendations developed through communication and involvement with the public and neighboring communities and users.” Despite the fact that fishers represented the majority of attendees at the meeting where the DLNR announced KPAG’s convening, KPAG included only one fisher representative, Denis Park. He resigned two years later, saying that KPAG bullied lawai’a and that it failed to open meetings to the public. On May 22, 2009, the BLNR adopted recommendations to protect cultural sites yet denied the petition for a hearing. On January 8, 2010, the BLNR unanimously approved the fence project. The Pacific Cooperative Studies Unit evaluative report states, “The vast majority of the public was supportive despite the vigorous objections of a few individuals.” However, it continues: “Two years were lost as a result of multiple contested cases filed against the project which prevented progress during their resolution.”

Summer Kaimalia Mullins-Ibrahim is a member of the lawai’a community and a so-called individual—along with Sabagala—who vigorously objected to fence construction. Having spent years fighting and researching the fence, Mullins-Ibrahim introduced me to the term fortress conservation. She explained, “It’s a completely western way of managing environments, closing people out, creating nature as only there to be visited, to enjoy for the day.” She clarified: “My understanding of environmentalism is based on ecology and understanding the entire system,” which includes people. In contrast, fortress conservation makes use of “fences and fines” to purportedly protect the environment from destructive, irrational humans engaging in subsistence practices. Approaching conservation as incompatible with human activity, fortress conservation fails to acknowledge that people have practiced sustainable resource use for generations. It employs an imagination of a pristine landscape with traditional subsistence practitioners as environmental spoilers. Here the state—not people—is the most effective manager of natural resources.

While fortress conservation captures the land tenure strategies at Ka‘ena that separate humans from the environment, I propose carceral conservationism to apprehend its criminalizing elements and the specific historical and geographical movements that contributed to fence construction. Carceral geographies examine the range of “spaces in which individuals are confined, subjected to surveillance or otherwise deprived of essential freedoms.” Carcerality contributes to the making of prisons, cities, and gated communities. This partitioning of space functions as “partial geographical solutions to political
economic crises.” This enterprise criminalizes populations, including, I argue, people engaging in indigenous ancestral practices as a way of life. To manage this perceived threat, multiple state bodies discipline and police populations deemed to imperil the security of the national body. The making of territorially bound—carceral—spaces enables the state and society as a whole to organize itself around such threats, containing populations both within and outside particular spaces and ways of life.

With its porous gates and permitting systems, carceral conservationism at Ka‘ena advances what the demilitarization activist and scholar Kyle Kajihiro dubs an environmentally productive regime of control that reinforces a set of expectations for proper citizens premised on their relationship to the natural world. Fences and fines cast homeless people and lawai‘a as illegal occupants, criminals, and not-green-enough subjects while marking tourists, birdwatchers, and recreational hikers as ideal stewards. In a legal analysis of the Ka‘ena fence, Bianca Isaki asserts: “The state does not openly denigrate Hawaiian culture, but recruits, shapes, and regulates the kinds of Hawaiian lives, cultures, and claims that can achieve state recognition.” Carceral conservationism at Ka‘ena represents a territorial compromise between the persistence of indigenous claims to land and state imperatives for legitimacy and control.

Remapping Carceral Landscapes: Mo‘olelo and Activism at Ka‘ena

Mullins-Ibrahim’s Kanaka Maoli family lived at Mākuʻa for generations, but because of its enclosure, Mullins-Ibrahim spent much of her early life fishing and camping at Ka‘ena with extended family. Unlike Mākuʻa Valley, with its tightly regulated entry, at Ka‘ena she experiences a strong sense of place, and she is as much part of Ka‘ena as Ka‘ena is part of her. We met up after she worked one day with thirty high school students to plant native shrubs and pick up nails from pallets used for bonfires, car parts, and beer bottles. Driving toward the fence to collect the waste, we passed signs that the students had attached to wooden posts. One read: “This land is your kupuna” (elder, ancestor); another said: “This is sacred land.” Figure 4 shows the Leina Ka ‘Uhane, a large, flat rock from which spirits leap into the next dimension after death. (The view is from the perspective of one entering Ka‘ena through caged gates nested in the fence.) From there, spirits jump into pō, the darkness where the universe originated. Mullins-Ibrahim has heard mo‘olelo (stories, history) of spiderwebs blocking spirits traveling to the Leina and doubts that they can pass through fences. Mullins-Ibrahim’s connections to the place characterized by knowledge of interdependence between humans and the natural world as
Figure 4. The Leina Ka’Uhane. Photograph by Summer Mullins-Ibrahim.

well as porosity between earthly and metaphysical realms shape an environmental vision that embraces possibilities excluded by the fence.

Soon four men wearing camouflage whom we presumed to be soldiers passed in a sand-colored jeep. When they stopped, she pulled over to speak to them, concerned that they were engaged in recreational off-roading, a common practice at Ka’ena that contributes to erosion and unearths iwi kupuna (bones of ancestors). They explained that they were working on the radio signals, gesturing toward the satellite trackers. Mullins-Ibrahim asked if they would help us remove trash from the area by lifting it into her truck, to which they obliged. Afterward she explained that off-roading has been a problem at Ka’ena for decades and that confronting off-roaders, who are sometimes soldiers as well as Hawaiian or local men, is a tactic of the Lawai’a Action Network. To control this problem, the State established the Ka’ena Point Natural Area Reserve in 1983 and placed boulders to block four-wheeler access to Ka’ena Point in 1992. Likewise, fence proponents argue that the exclusion of off-roaders is the only way that the seabird populations can thrive. While the State manages off-roaders by controlling entry to the space, Mullins-Ibrahim engages in dialogue and confrontation that contests environmental destruction and demands that every visitor take care of the place.
Soon after this encounter, Mullins-Ibrahim pointed out Pōhakuloa, a large rock beside the road. We told the Pōhakuloa moʻolelo together out loud. Kaʻena is considered one of the homes of the deity Hiʻiaka, the patron of hula who represents a counterpart to the fire and destruction associated with her sister, Pele. Pele sent Hiʻiaka across the islands to fetch Pele’s lover on the island of Kauai and equipped Hiʻiaka with supernatural strength and a lightning pāʻū (skirt). On the journey, Hiʻiaka visited Mākua. One day, as a young girl jumped into Mākua’s coastal waters, Pōhakuloa—a shapeshifter—turned from shark to rock, knocking the girl unconscious. Hiʻiaka struck the girl with the skirt to revive her. Hiʻiaka then proclaimed from the edge of a cliff that the rock is a supernatural being that “actually has the body of a man, and his true name is Pōhakuloa.” In defense of the child, Hiʻiaka threw the rock to Kaʻena, several miles away.

Such place-based counternarratives accomplish three objectives. First, they articulate a web of relationships between humans, deities, and the natural world, proposing cosmologies that confound those enforced by the partitioning of fences. Just as Pele and Hiʻiaka share a reciprocal relationship as sisters, Hawaiian cosmologies cast the ʻāina (land, that which feeds) as the sibling of humans. These paradigms rename and remap places just as the signs created by the students remind visitors that land is sacred. As a place where remembering and imagining inform each other, Kaʻena represents a “critical [site] in the construction and revision of theory, method, and praxis.” Conscious of how race, class, and colonial positionality shape daily relations to place, such moʻolelo create new and original possibilities.

Second, and relatedly, moʻolelo represent indigenous intellectual traditions invoking histories of dispossession. Kajihiro interprets the shapeshifting rock as a metaphor for the US military in Hawaiʻi. In 1890 Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan affirmed that Hawaiʻi was the key to the survival of Western civilization because of its strategic position in relation to Asia. In 1893 US Marines landed in Honolulu, leading to the overthrow of Queen Liliuokalani and establishment of the provisional Republic of Hawaiʻi, an action that US commissioner James Blount officially recognized as illegal the following year. The 1898 Spanish-American War brought unprecedented military expansion. During the early twentieth century, when a Hawaiian-language newspaper published the Hiʻiaka moʻolelo, military forces were building on the islands. Later, during World War II, the general public understood the US military as a protector of the people of Hawaiʻi in the face of a potential Japanese invasion. Today, the military presents itself as an environmental steward despite
the fact that it is the single largest polluter of the United States and controls 23 percent of O‘ahu.47

The State of Hawai‘i mimics this shapeshifting. In 2010 the Hawai‘i State legislature attempted to pass a bill acknowledging the “great cultural, historical, and spiritual significance [of sharks] for many native Hawaiians, native Hawaiian practitioners, and others who value the Hawai‘ian culture,” whereas previously State policies had sanctioned mass shark killings. Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller and Noenoe Silva argue that shapeshifting legitimizes state authority in the face of indigenous claims to land while transferring land stewardship responsibilities away from indigenous people. The telling and retelling of mo‘olelo about a shapeshifting shark critiques these practices while reterritorializing space for indigenous practices.48 These worldviews precede and for many exceed the changing practices that partition humans from the natural world.49

Third, Indigenous intellectual traditions challenge the legitimacy of carceral strategies. A hunter who regularly passed under a fence surrounding a military base to hunt for pigs and goats clarified, “I wouldn’t break the law otherwise, but this is our land. It didn’t belong to anybody before the military took it away.”50 In his eyes, as well as the eyes of many opposed to the US occupation of Hawai‘i, the military and State control of land is illegitimate and even illegal. In recent years, this idea has achieved commonsense status among Kānaka Maoli, as evidenced by wide and vocal opposition to US federal recognition of Hawaiian people at the 2014 hearings hosted by the Department of the Interior. Many refer to the scholarship of Keanu Sai, who argues that the legal status of the Hawaiian Kingdom is that of an independent—albeit occupied—nation-state, appealing to the 1907 Hague Regulations that maintain and protect occupied states.51 While some cite from international law, the hunter defines Hawaiian self-determination as “our way of life, we live off the land. I hunt and fish to feed my family. That’s the way our grandparents did it.” He provides an informal definition of sovereignty: everyday environmental practices that provide sustenance while making connections with places that are personal, familial, and communal.

The DLNR and Environmental Land Management

Aila, as a fisherman with ancestral ties to Ka‘ena and as the chair of the DLNR, ultimately agrees with lawai‘a about many issues plaguing the area. They detest off-roading because of its destructive elements. They also abhor people who approach Ka‘ena as a place to light bonfires and drink, leaving copious trash. They all spoke in disdain about people who lack knowledge about resource
protection, overfish, and thus deplete the area of life. However, they diverged significantly in their views on strategies for land and resource management. As a result of his complex allegiances, Aila stands literally and figuratively “on the fence” between the State of Hawai‘i and lawai‘a. The DLNR published a draft Environmental Assessment for the Ka‘ena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project in December 2007, almost three years before Aila’s appointment as chair. Further, after Aila’s term, the harassment of fishers at Ka‘ena worsened, according to Sabagala, who fishes at Ka‘ena regularly.52

As chair of the DLNR, Aila invoked the importance of pragmatic governance to handle daily challenges. Repeatedly stressing the importance of accommodating traditional and customary practices while preventing homeless people from occupying State land, he explained of his job responsibilities, “I gotta manage . . . for public health, safety, and the environment.” He clarified that tickets issued by the DLNR for camping during fence construction did not target fishers; rather, they policed homeless people in response to a rape in the area and the burning of cars. While emphasizing law and order, Aila draws from indigenous traditions to inform his understandings of land management. He invoked the traditional kapu system that delineated when people can catch certain fish depending on their breeding schedules, which exemplifies the “agreement that we have to each other in society” that he works to fulfill. I pressed that a tension exists between modern governance and ancestral Hawaiian knowledge, and that many question the legitimate authority of the State and federal government. Aila responded, “I gotta deal with the situation that I’m presented with now, and not live in this romantic vision,” and elaborated on the importance of achieving “the right balance under these modern complex conditions.”53 As someone intimately familiar with Hawai‘i’s land, culture, and resources, Aila’s environmental knowledge and professional commitments enabled him to effectively fulfill State of Hawai‘i prerogatives: the maintenance of law and order, the practical management of natural resources; the administration of people, laws, and institutions; and legitimacy in the face of claims to the contrary.

This organizes space “according the underlying principles of rational organization, classification, procedure, and rules of administration,” which Eyal Weizman cites as legitimizing tactics for contemporary military occupation—yet I contend that the State of Hawai‘i employs such measures to challenge the military domination of land.54 As a State actor who has also worked for decades for Māku‘a Valley’s return from military control, Aila vehemently denies that the fence represents a military infrastructure and repeatedly emphasized
that lawai’a continue to fish at Ka‘ena. In fact, for well over half a century, the State has engaged in efforts to wrest land from military control and convert it to parkland. For example, a letter from Hawai‘i’s territorial governor, Ingram Stainback, dated November 26, 1945, three months after Japan’s surrender, urged the US military to reconsider its request to transfer 6,608 acres of Mākua to the War Department. Stainback writes:

The land requested to be transferred includes . . . almost the only remaining area suitable for camp sites and other recreational areas. The vicinity offers good fishing and a beach formerly enjoyed by the Public. . . . these lands should be made available to the public again and not permanently removed from their enjoyment.\(^{55}\)

The letter unheeded, President Lyndon B. Johnson, in the midst of the Vietnam War in 1964, issued an executive order and signed a lease enabling the military to use Mākua Valley for sixty-five years for a dollar.\(^{56}\) Stainback is not the only Hawai‘i governor who has supported Mākua’s return. Likely in response to advocates such as Aila—whose uncle was displaced from Mākua—Neil Abercrombie, the former governor of Hawai‘i, has also vocalized support for its return.\(^{57}\) The Ka‘ena fence could be understood as an aggrandizing tool for the State of Hawai‘i, simultaneously mimicking and challenging the US military’s far-reaching territorial jurisdiction.

At the same time, the indigenous paradigms and practices of lawai’a defy the efficacy and legality of competing colonial institutions by offering wholly alternative visions for social organization, economic systems, and environmental relationships. While Mullins-Ibrahim and the Lawai’a Action Network were unable to stop fence construction, they hindered its progress through tactics that included organizing fishers, filing petitions for a court hearing, contesting tickets in court, bringing people to Ka‘ena to care for the land, confronting off-roaders, and documenting the fence’s continued erosion. The indigenous intellectual traditions of lawai’a informed these efforts by critiquing, questioning, and confronting partitions. In turn, the US military and other state institutions approach self-determination efforts rooted in place-based knowledge as a threat to their sovereignty over land. While Aila emphasized that these policies do not displace Hawaiians or fishers, carceral conservationism manages and contains indigenous practices that present viable noncapitalist modes of survival. It further signifies a culmination of three historical movements: World War II martial law, the rise of the security state, and the expansion of the tourist complex.
Genealogy of Partitions at Mākua and Ka‘ena

World War II and Martial Law

In the months after the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor bombing, the US military constructed fences and installed barbed wire all over the island. A 1977 ethnographic report by Marion Kelly and Sidney Quintal, based on interviews with former Mākua residents, explains: “To the attack on Pearl Harbor and the fears of an imminent invasion, the military in Hawaii responded immediately (sic) with a barbed-wire-and-pill-box defense posture along the coastlines of the islands.” Mākua’s coastline hosted what was probably one of O‘ahu’s last remaining fishing villages. After the army evicted its inhabitants, the military demolished structures supporting life in the valley: “Pipelines [were] cut, fishing holes bombed, and fresh water wells were used as dumps for waste oil.” As a result, Mākua Valley “transformed from a relatively peaceful cattle ranch into a busy garrison.”58 Aila shared stories passed through his family: “Beaches were all barbed wired, nobody could go. Fishing wasn’t allowed. There was rationing going on in terms of poi [the Hawaiian dietary staple made from taro] and flour and gasoline and . . . it was a hard time for people, especially people who depended on the ocean.”59 Through partitions, the US military organized the environment according to the stated need for security and, as a result, transformed entire ways of life.60

The history of the policing and internment of Japanese people in Hawai‘i is relatively well documented,61 yet the mass displacement of Hawaiians has received less scholarly attention. The US Army forced Mākua residents to leave and told them that they could return six months after the war. An evicted resident remarked, “There is nothing you can do. You cannot say no.” This was because land ownership at Mākua had already shifted into the hands of one landlord, Link McCandless, who was a cattle rancher, politician, and builder of artesian wells across the island. He had previously purchased and appropriated twenty-four of twenty-eight parcels of Mākua’s land and converted much of the valley into a cattle ranch where mostly Hawaiian and Japanese residents lived as tenants. Further, another interviewee described the mass “hysteria” during this time.62

Hawaiians still mourn the loss of land. Mullins-Ibrahim, whose family was displaced from Mākua, describes the trauma of displacement. “We’ve been plucked out of the ground,” she lamented. “The umbilical cord [has been] severed.” Mullins-Ibrahim’s family moved to Wahiawa, a military town on the other side of the Wai‘anae mountains, and Mullins-Ibrahim grew up attend-
ing school with the children of soldiers. For Hawaiians, land is the source of livelihood, well-being, and belonging, and a profound sense of connection to place signifies a foundation of Hawaiian identity. For Mullins-Ibrahim, the Ka‘ena fence represents another iteration of separation and displacement. Militarization asserts territorial control over spaces through carceral measures that displace “outsiders” and indigenous populations alike, both of whom threaten the control of land by an occupying force.

The Rise of the Security State

Competing with military control of land, the State of Hawai‘i protects the environment while policing people who live outside capitalist private-property relations. In 1999 Laura Thielen, a former DLNR chair, justified a ban on “camping paraphernalia” in wildlife sanctuaries by stating that it would protect the environment and tourists from “tent cities.” In 2009 the Committee on Water, Land, and Ocean Resources of the State House of Representatives introduced HB 645 to enact a pilot program for camping passes for Ka‘ena, which failed to pass. Aila, regarding camping regulations, explained his prerogative to allow lawai‘a protection from the elements while preventing the homeless from occupying Ka‘ena.

A striking example of the DLNR prerogative to displace homeless people from State lands can be traced to 1996, when three hundred people, 83 percent of whom were Kānaka Maoli, lived in an interdependent community at Mākua Beach in shelters of tarp and wood. On March 8 the DLNR approved an agreement with the army authorizing its control over the shoreline from Mākua to Ka‘ena Point, which they designated Ka‘ena Point State Park. Four days later, the DLNR issued an eviction notice at Mākua. Arguing that the place provided a place of healing from colonialism, forty former residents and supporters stayed. One asserted, “We’re poor, but we’re not living poorly,” while others cited challenges accessing government services. As such, life at Mākua enacted both the reclamation of space for Hawaiians and class struggle waged by the poor. The DLNR, on the other hand, deemed them “illegal occupants,” claimed that they impeded beach access, and argued that the place is better used as a park. The highly publicized June 18 eviction involved more than one hundred State and County law enforcement officials, marine patrol boats, police helicopters, and twelve National Guard soldiers. The DLNR’s Division of Conservation and Resource Enforcement (DOCARE) arrested sixteen people. Today, gates limit vehicular entrance to weekends. Indeed, there is great irony in the fact that the military occupies over four thousand acres at
Mākua Valley, which is uninhabitable because of unexploded ordnance, while the State claimed that homeless people on a relatively small stretch of beach impeded public access.

The construction of fences alongside the criminalization of homeless people and subsistence practitioners at Kaʻena and Mākua consolidate the power of the State of Hawaiʻi and US military in the face of crisis, particularly at moments “when the balance of class forces are upset.”72 The final eviction of people from Mākua Beach, who lived without paying rent or mortgages, and the policing of Kaʻena fishers, who continue to engage in productive labor outside a market economy, stand as striking examples of the state prerogative to manage instability. Relatedly, multiple crises have defined recent years in Hawaiʻi. First, the soaring price of real estate has made renting a home on the islands outside the realm of possibility for Hawaiʻi’s poor and working class. A severe lack of government support for affordable or subsidized housing compounds this problem. Second, like much of the planet, Hawaiʻi now faces a major environmental crisis, influenced by the continual loss of land for sustainable agriculture to real estate development and agribusinesses such as Monsanto and Syngenta. In recent years, Hawaiian and environmental movements have forged a powerful alliance, resulting in previously nonexistent regulations for dangerous agricultural practices such as chemical spraying. In addition, 2015 broke weather records, with eight documented hurricanes tracked in the Pacific that approached the islands.73 Third, the Hawaiian movement poses a significant crisis for existing state formations, marked by the increasing traction of demands for independence.

In the face of instability, noncompliance, and efforts for self-determination, the state functions as a connecting force that “holds a ruptured social formation together.” Carceral conservationism coercively bonds people to capitalist land tenure systems and ways of life. By preventing or managing access to life-giving resources such as living space and places to fish, multiple and sometimes competing state bodies “police the crisis.”74 Paul Amar dubs this the “human-security state,” which works to “protect, rescue, and secure” spaces in the face of human rights demands while maintaining the hierarchies of existing state and capitalist formations.75 Carceral conservation strategies secure space while legitimizing the state in the face of environmental, economic, and social crisis.

Yet at Kaʻena, multiple and competing actors shape a landscape of occupation. In addition to the State of Hawaiʻi and US military, nonstate actors such as off-roaders impede the DLNR’s objectives to protect, conserve, and manage natural resources while intruding in the lives of lawai’a engaging in interdependent relational practices with the land and ocean. Yet while the
DLNR considers off-roaders a problem, Sabagala and Mullins-Ibrahim often film unregulated off-roading activities. They have engaged in this political tactic since 2008, when the Lawai’a Action Network purchased video cameras in response to DOCARE’s harassment of fishers. Their filming aims to draw attention to both the DLNR’s lack of enforcement as well as the destruction caused by off-roading practices. According to Weizman, “Chaos has its peculiar structural advantages,” because it justifies and naturalizes domination over territory. One aim of territorial control—among many—is to secure conditions to enable the unhindered flow of capital. In Hawai’i today, tourism functions as a primary source of accumulation.

The Expansion of the Tourist Complex

Ka’ena’s landscape conveys the palpable confluence of tourist and military infrastructures. In December 2014, the DLNR constructed a yellow steel bar as part of a new permitting system to regulate vehicular access and prevent off-roading. As a result, the number of hikers in January 2015 spiked dramatically. Overhead, planes flew every thirty minutes from Dillingham Air Field down the road, an operational base that the US military began to fully utilize during World War II. While “the military maintains priority for use at all times,” the State leases 272 acres for “civilian use” and subleases land to sky diving and glider concessions. Here the State of Hawai’i repurposes military infrastructure for recreation, bringing economic activity to a rural region where plantations have long been closed. As an industry that capitalizes on the surplus of land and wealth from war, tourism signifies an extension of militarization by promoting a similar—yet less direct—process of dispossession.

Mullins-Ibrahim and Sabagala both fear that the fence signifies a step in converting Ka’ena to tourist destination with regulated entry, intimating that Ka’ena could become like the Hanauma Bay Nature Preserve on southeast O’ahu, a popular tourist destination with copious fish where fishing is now banned. To enter, tourists view a film on safety and pay a $7.50 fee. Tourist development has gradually affected Wai’anae, as a controversial hotel complex on its south end, called Ko Olina, now hosts a Disney Resort. Kaonalua Kane, a resident of a village neighboring Ko Olina, described the area as full of Kiawe trees and owls before hotel development. As a child, he spent countless hours on beaches playing with friends, but the hotels made it clear that they were no longer welcome. Today, his primary job entails protecting cultural sites, and after work he regularly visits Ko Olina to socialize and dance in hula shows every Tuesday night at a hotel. Kane’s experiences represent Mullins-Ibrahim’s fear of the assimilation of lifestyles and indigenous practices into tourist econo-
Contested Landscapes and Technologies of Dispossession at Ka‘ena Point, Hawai‘i

She feared that as a “cultural place,” the Leina Ka Uhane would become a landmark in a “pristine cultural landscape [where] the Native Hawaiians, speaking in past tense, used to believe . . .” she trailed off, implying that the beliefs themselves are irrelevant.

Remaking landscapes, the Ka‘ena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project facilitates the ideological and material transformation of a space where fishing is a way of life to a wildlife refuge that welcomes the leisuring practices of tourists. Honolulu Soaring, which charters vehicles over Ka‘ena, advertises: “What a wonderful way to see the island, in our sleek high-performance aircraft. . . . Panoramic vistas unfold . . . on the wings of the wind with sights and sensations never experienced before. It’s thrilling, it’s serene; and it’s HAWAII!” Such language exploits the dramatic landscape and pleasure-seeking sensibilities of visitors with virtually unfettered mobility. Similarly, a DLNR official rationalized the installation of the Ka‘ena gate regulating vehicular entry by declaring the need to protect the area’s “fragile resources” at “one of the last ‘wild’ places on Oahu.” Portrayals of “wild and gigantic” nature in “an unclaimed and timeless space” conflates femininity with nature and advances a paradigm that subjects the environment to the management and regulation of a strong, capable state. In doing so, tourist apparatuses and the State of Hawai‘i replace indigenous modes of land tenure premised on fishing labor to feed neighbors, friends, and extended family with a new set of economic relations. A tourist visiting Hawai‘i for a week may pay for a hotel, rent a car, drive to Ka‘ena, then eat a pricey meal and shop at nearby Hale‘iwa town. While the Ka‘ena fence may not itself produce a traceable profit, it secures conditions for accumulation by promoting a lifestyle that recasts land as a source of recreation and leisure rather than subsistence and informal exchange (see fig. 5).

Carceral conservationism imposes an environmental paradigm that aggrandizes nature while promoting its management and consumption to bolster both tourism and militarization. The term militourism refers to the set of logics, imaginaries, and processes premised on advancing tourism and war preparation in places such as Hawai‘i. It enables supple forms of domination to mask and facilitate the brutality of militarism. As such, carceral conservationism at Māku‘a legitimizes the military’s control of land for geopolitical dominance, while carceral conservationism at Ka‘ena secures conditions for tourism and thus capitalist accumulation. By managing and containing homeless people and lawai‘a at Ka‘ena, carceral conservationism manages the tenuous relationship between people and territories and humans and the environment. Forging subjectivities and fashioning landscapes, it promotes the dual projects of capitalism and war.
Bianca Isaki argues that the Kaʻena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project constitutes “settler state conservation,” criminalizing and displacing indigenous people under the aegis of environmental protection. I elaborate that carceral conservationism structures settler colonialism and signifies a culmination of historical processes that overdetermine the “zero-sum logic whereby settler societies for all of their internal complexities uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives.” Related scholarship on Asian settler colonialism confronts narratives that celebrate Asian ascendance in Hawai‘i. Responding to Haunani-Kay Trask’s call for settlers of color to acknowledge their complicity in Hawaiian dispossession, Candace Fujikane critiques celebratory proclamations that “we working people struggled for and built Hawai‘i!” The triumphant discourses about the work and resistance associated with plantation labor and the building of infrastructure such as roadways, malls, schools, and suburbs ignore the fact that such structures manifested Hawaiian dispossession. Applying these frameworks to Kaʻena, Isaki considers the
“sentimental aggression” that Asian fishers direct toward Hawaiian homeless people because of their lack of access to property. This literature challenges liberal multiculturalist narratives that flatten the differential histories of the people of Hawai‘i. As Dean Saranillio states, “Examining [Asian settler and Hawaiian] projects and aims in complex unity helps us to be mindful of the different ways these variegated groups relate differently to settler state formation and projects of empire without losing sight of the ideological collisions, moments of accountability, and/or work at solidarity.” Responding to this call, this essay uncovers Hawaiian-local cooperation at Ka‘ena predicated on common connections to place.

A lesson from Ka‘ena is the fact that lawai‘a represents a place-based identity that crosses the bounds of indigeneity, providing an example in which “variegated groups” find common cause. As an example, Sabagala knows Ka‘ena’s underwater crevices and coral heads better than the back of his hands, and holds personal stake in Hawaiian efforts for self-determination. He identifies as lawai‘a, and also does not have Hawaiian blood relations. The descendant of plantation workers, Sabagala’s Filipino father learned to fish from uncles who worked at the Dillingham railroad that crossed Ka‘ena. A Kanaka named Old Man Aku taught Sabagala’s great uncles to fish the Hawaiian way—throwing net and observing kapu. Sabagala explained a fact about Hawaiian history that warrants further scholarly attention: it was common for Hawaiians and local Asian workers to exchange land-based knowledge for produce from plantations. In addition to teaching them to fish, Old Man Aku taught them to honor the land by recognizing the mo‘olelo of the place. This story depicts the collaborations and solidarities between Filipinos and Hawaiians rooted in place-based connections rather than liberal multiculturalist modes of settler colonialism. For Mullins-Ibrahim, nonnative local lawai‘a “grew up and were raised alongside my great uncles and uncles and cousins.” Like Hawaiian practitioners, locals “continue to pass down fishing practices that have been taught to them by lawai‘a kupuna (elders). And they are out there taking care of the ‘āina right alongside Native Hawaiian practitioners.”

While Sabagala’s family has a different history from that of Mullins-Ibrahim and Sabagala’s fishing partner, Ace Andicko Navarro, who is also Hawaiian, carceral conservatism homogenizes Kanaka Maoli and nonnative lawai‘a by subjecting them all to criminalization and displacement. Because of this, nonnative locals worked alongside Hawaiians protesting fence construction, carceral conservatism, and dispossession. Noelani Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua traces the beginnings of the Hawaiian movement to land struggles in which Kanaka and nonnative local working-class people fought to stay in places they lived,
fished, farmed, hunted, gathered, and practiced ritual ceremonies. Likewise, the mo’olelo of Ka’ena lawai’a open space for complexity, nuance, and solidarity by recognizing connections between Hawaiians and nonnative locals with generational ties to a place.

Structuring native dispossession, the fence does not produce clear dividing lines between natives and settlers. In fact, the fence differentiates Hawaiians from each other, as it positioned Aila against other lawai’a. Thus, his positional identity conveys the messiness of settler colonial projects. As an actor with authority over Hawai’i’s State lands, he has used his power to bolster demilitarization initiatives and accommodate traditional customary rights and practices while advancing State of Hawai’i prerogatives for land management, legitimacy, and control of resources. One could say that his limits of possibility were literally confined by the prerogatives of the institution that he works for. As Patrick Wolfe argues, “Invasion is a structure, not an event.” Within a structural framework, identity categories are salient yet secondary to the primary forces at play at Ka’ena: carceral geographies that dispossess lawai’a of living space, contain noncapitalist economic practices, and produce uneven access to resources while boosting capitalism and war.

Conclusion: Countertopographies on the Wai’anae Coast

As an ideology and practice, carceral conservationism enforces an environmental paradigm that partitions lawai’a and homeless people from the environment. In doing so, it interrupts, manages, and criminalizes ways of life for those who live in intimate relationship to the land and ocean as a mode of identity and survival. While it does not prevent subsistence activities at Ka’ena, carceral conservationism represents a mode of state-based land tenure that accommodates lifestyles premised on capitalist consumption rather than subsistence, solidarity, and informal exchange. Whether or not the fence has effectively protected wildlife, carceral conservationism at Ka’ena represents a crystallization of the widespread fencing that characterized martial law during World War II, the rise of the security state and concomitant escalation of its putative dimensions, and the growth of the tourist complex. As a product of the confluence of militarization and tourism, carceral conservationism also propels both projects.

At the same time, indigenous cosmologies that invoke intimate personal, familial, and spiritual connections to the natural world inform the environmentalism of lawai’a and community efforts for resource protection. The invocation of indigenous intellectual traditions is a primary strategy that Hawaiian and
nonnative lawai‘a employ to make and remake relations to time and place, challenging the legitimacy of enclosure. Mo‘olelo articulate countertopographies that reframe relations to places as rooted in collective and cross-cutting strategies of survival and resistance that counter the colonial logics of carceral-ity. As Cindi Katz argues, “Countertopographies can slice through the lethal binaries of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ calling forth political projects that can confront what it means to live—everywhere—in the shards of capitalist modernity, and make impossible the maneuvers of global capitalism and militarized adventur-ism that would use these shards as a weapon.” It is precisely these paradigms that the US military and State of Hawai‘i DLNR approach as threats to their sovereignty over land and land-based knowledge. Through carceral measures such as fences, contested state institutions reconsolidate legitimacy through the containment of practices that yield alternatives to dispossession, war, and capitalist accumulation. In response, Hawaiian intellectual traditions inform burgeoning efforts for self-determination in Hawai‘i and propose paradigms that can inform movements against colonialism and carceral-ity on a global scale.

Notes
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2. For all Hawaiian terms and place-names, such as “O‘ahu” and “Ka‘ena,” I use appropriate diacritical marks, including the ‘okina (glottal stop) and kahak¯ o (macron), except in instances where quotations, proper nouns, and reports did not use them in the original.
4. Notes on terminology: first, I use Hawaiian, indigenou, Kanaka Maoli, and Kanaka interchangeably. While the term Kanaka Maoli represents a decolonizing practice, Hawaiian reflects Hawai‘i vernacular and reminds readers that Hawaiian does not work as a residency marker, like Californian. Rather, as Queen Liliuokalani stated, “When I speak . . . of the Hawaiian people, I refer to the children of the soil,—the native inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands and their descendants” (quoted in Kehaulani Kauanui, Hawaiian Blood [Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008], xii). Note that Kānaka or Kānaka Maoli (with a macron) denotes plural. Second, scholars including Haunani-Kay Trask argue for the specificity of Native genealogical ties and political conditions in Hawai‘i. They thus critique local as a term that celebrates Asian insider status Hawai‘i while denying indigenous history and dispossession (Trask, “Settlers of Color and ‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawai‘i,” Amerasia Journal 26.2 [2000]: 2–3). Acknowledging this critique, this manuscript rethinks possibilities for solidarity.
between Hawaiians and locals by considering lawai’a as a place-based identity, which I further discuss in the last section.


7. William Aila, interview by author, July 13, 2014, Wai‘anae, Hawai‘i. Lowercase state refers to a contradictory set of institutions, individuals, and ideologies that exercise authority over a particular territory. Capitalized State in this piece refers to the State of Hawai‘i.


12. William Aila, interview by author, October 6, 2013, Wai‘anae, Hawai‘i.


22. Ibid.

23. Ka‘ena Point Ecosystem Restoration Project Public Hearing, October 5, 2009, Wai‘alu‘u, Hawai‘i (“Is the Proposed Predator Fence at Ka‘ena Really Necessary?,” video, Ka‘ena Cultural Practice Project, November 2, 2009, kaenapractitioners.blogspot.com/2009/11/is-proposed-predator-fence-at-kaena. html). Liesemeyer continues: the fence is “the best way to ensure that we don’t have catastrophic losses” to birds from events such as dog attacks. However, visitors frequently bring unleashed dogs past the Ka‘ena fence.


29. Summer Kaimalia Mullins-Ibrahim, interview by author, October 15, 2013, Ka‘ena, Hawai‘i.
45. Maly, “Final Oral History Study.”
49. Dean Saranillio, conversation with author, November 18, 2015, New York.
50. Anonymous hunter and fisher, conversation with author, January 5, 2011, Mākuia, Hawai‘i.
52. Al Sabagala, conversation with author, August 1, 2015, Ka‘ena, Hawai‘i.
54. Weizman, Hollow Land, 5.
55. Letter, Hawai‘i Territorial Governor Ingram M. Stainback to Major General HT Burgin, Commanding General of Central Pacific Base Command, November 26, 1945, in Marion Kelly and Sidney Quintal, “Cultural History Report of Makua Military Reservation and Vicinity: Mākuia Valley, O‘ahu, Hawai‘i. Prepared for the Department of the Army” (Honolulu, HI: Department of Anthropology, Bishop Museum, 1977), Appendix D.
58. Kelly and Quintal, “Cultural History Report.”
60. Loyd with Gilmore, “Race, Capitalist Crisis, and Abolitionist Organizing.”
63. Mullins-Ibrahim, interview.
66. Aila, e-mail correspondence, December 31, 2015.
74. Hall et al., Policing the Crisis.
76. Weizman, Hollow Land.
77. According to Aila, the increase in tourists results from the fence’s success in increasing native plants, birds, turtles, and monk seals (e-mail correspondence, December 31, 2015).
80. Kaonolua Kane, interview by author, September 25, 2013, Kapolei, Hawai‘i; Mullins-Ibrahim, interview.
85. Isaki, “State Conservation as Settler Colonial Governance.”

89. Al Sabagala, phone conversation with author, January 20, 2015; Summer Kaimalia Mullins-Ibrahim, e-mail correspondence with author, December 2, 2015.


91. Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native.”