




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Colliding Histories: Hawai'i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians "Ineligible to Citizenship" and Hawaiians "Unfit for Self-Government"

Dean Itsuji Saranillio


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COLLIDING HISTORIES

*Hawai‘i Statehood at the Intersection of Asians
“Ineligible to Citizenship” and Hawaiians “Unfit
for Self-Government”*

dean itsuji **saranillio**

Said monies . . . being illegally expended [by the Hawaii Statehood Commission] are used to aid private purposes and individuals and are an illegal gift of public moneys to the proponents of statehood for Hawaii . . . to the exclusion and detriment of citizens and taxpayers of the territory of Hawaii opposed to statehood.

—Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell,
plaintiff in *Campbell v. Stainback
et al.* lawsuit filed on January 17, 1948
(anniversary of the U.S.-backed
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom)

ON THE MORNING OF AUGUST 19, 2006, state representative Barbara Marumoto, dressed as the Statue of Liberty, and state senator Sam Slom, waving a large American flag, led a group to ‘Iolani Palace to celebrate Admission Day—a state holiday that commemorates Hawai‘i statehood. This group’s state-sponsored commemoration, however, was blocked by Native Hawaiian grassroots activists who stated that ‘Iolani Palace was an inappropriate place to celebrate statehood because it is sacred grounds and also the site of the 1893 U.S.-backed overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom.¹ Verbal arguments and near-physical confrontations followed and continued for more than an hour until the group celebrating statehood decided to leave. In 2008, again on Admission Day, more than twenty members of another Hawaiian group were arrested for seizing ‘Iolani Palace in an attempt to reinstate a Hawaiian government.

Similar actions opposing statehood celebrations took place in the months leading up to Admission Day on the fiftieth anniversary of Hawai'i statehood in 2009.² While the state of Hawai'i quietly commemorated its golden anniversary by holding a public conference to envision Hawai'i's future as a U.S. state, titled "New Horizons for the Next 50 Years," Hawaiian groups gathered outside to project a future wish for a world without U.S. imperialist influence. A twelve-foot-tall effigy of Uncle Sam, painted with dollar signs in his eyes and holding two large guns with the words "genocide" and "imperialism" written on each, led a march of more than a thousand protestors to the Hawai'i Convention Center where the conference was being held. The Uncle Sam effigy was pushed on a cart made to look like a U.S. military Stryker combat vehicle—a direct reference to a broad-based community struggle to oppose them being housed on the islands and the further contamination of lands used for live-fire training.³ Adding historical legibility and broader context to the protest, Uncle Sam's hat was decorated with feathers each with the name of a different nation whose sovereignty has been violated by the United States, such as First Nations, the Philippines, Guam, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Iraq. In addition, around the Stryker vehicle were cutouts of bombs with the names of sites in Hawai'i and elsewhere that have been devastated by U.S. war and military training: Kaho'olawe, Mākua, Bikini, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Vieques. The demonstration aimed to disrupt the official histories publicized in the months leading up to Admission Day by expanding on these narrations' deliberate silences, specifically a genocidal history of U.S. territorial expropriation and U.S. military occupation, processes both productive of Hawai'i statehood. Outside the convention center, speakers addressed the consequences of the United States in Hawai'i and its connections to other sites of U.S. empire. The portion of the demonstration that received the most attention, however, was the cutting out and burning of the fiftieth star from the American flag.⁴

Contrary to the romantic images of Hawai'i peddled globally by a billion-dollar tourism industry, heated political battles between groups, each armed with opposing histories, occur frequently in Hawai'i. As the protests on Admission Day illustrate, continuing memory of the 1893 overthrow, a violation of Hawaiian national sovereignty and self-determi-

nation acknowledged and apologized for by the United States, continues to animate such counternarratives.⁵ For many, Hawai'i statehood is a manifestation of the overthrow, sustaining the relations of domination necessary for U.S. state, economic, and military assaults to continue into the present. In fact, the intensity of the Admission Day protests were not simply inspired by competing nationalisms but shaped by a wide range of ongoing state-sanctioned assaults against Native Hawaiians. Throughout 2009, Hawaiian groups protested Republican governor Linda Lingle's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse a decision by the Hawai'i Supreme Court, which ruled that the state could not sell or transfer so-called ceded lands until claims on these lands by a future Hawaiian government have been resolved. These are an estimated 1.8 million acres of Hawaiian crown and government lands that were seized by the United States at the time of imposed annexation and turned over to the state of Hawai'i through the 1959 Admission Act.

Other ongoing assaults against Native Hawaiians include a string of lawsuits seeking to dismantle all Hawaiian specific "entitlements" by claiming them to be racially discriminatory against non-Hawaiians; the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act, or Akaka Bill, which would create a federally recognized indigenous government, but a nation with no land guaranteed and potentially troubling future claims to autonomy from the United States; continued corporate, military, and residential developments that desecrate Hawaiian sacred sites and burials; the ecological dangers of multinational agricultural corporation genetically modified organisms (GMOs)⁶ testing in the islands; the continued use of Mākua Valley and Pohakuloa for live-fire military training; and an exorbitant rental and real estate market responsible for a growing diaspora and tent cities filled primarily with "house-less"⁷ Hawaiians, which line the beaches that tourists are told not to visit. Although this is far from a comprehensive list of ongoing issues, it illustrates the fact that many Native Hawaiians are engaged in continued struggle against state, military, and corporate actions whose interests are in direct conflict with Hawaiian political and cultural associations with Hawai'i. Indeed, the circulation of official state histories and exotic images of Hawai'i function to ideologically obfuscate and materially distribute a violent economy of occupation—domination

through subjugation, profit through desecration, leisure through exploitation, and the articulation of liberal and conservative notions of civil rights and democracy that render the U.S. occupation of Hawai‘i a logical impossibility.

Contemporary criticisms of Native Hawaiian protests on Admission Day contend that such opposition is politically contrived and ahistorical, arguing that Hawaiians wholly embraced statehood, even playing crucial roles in its achievement.⁸ Such disavowals from positions of presumed omnipotence, however, are not without their own truths.⁹ Many in Hawai‘i, including numerous Native Hawaiians, did support a state-led movement to gain their civil rights as “first-class American citizens,” seeking to displace a territorial structure that benefited elite *haole* (white) settlers while also advancing a liberal and antiracist ideal that U.S. citizenship should not be limited to *haole* only. Often cited is the June 1959 congressionally mandated plebiscite, which revealed that of the 155,000 registered voters, 17 to 1 were in favor of statehood (132,773 to 7,971).¹⁰ Yet as Mililani Trask, former Pacific expert to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, has argued, the 1959 statehood ballot used in the plebiscite was written to limit the vote to either statehood or territorial status and did not include the United Nations’ mandated options for “independence” or other “separate systems of self-government.”¹¹ Furthermore, in the decades leading to the 1959 plebiscite, the state monopolized taxpayer monies to finance a protracted opinion campaign targeting a local and national populace to support statehood. This campaign’s control of public resources, its volume and visibility, aimed to silence the opposition, even actively blocking movements or narratives from forming.

Given the fact that, for many, the history of Hawai‘i statehood is a liberal moral allegory about the inclusion of nonwhite groups into the United States, what Governor Lingle affirmed as a “model of tolerance ahead of its time,” the idea that the civil liberties achieved through statehood came at the expense of Native Hawaiian rights to self-government is cause for major contemporary conflict and animosity.¹² This essay offers a kind of “history of the present,” tracing two mutually constitutive but competing projects in the post–World War II period—the racial project combating the exclusion of Asian Americans from a U.S. national polity, particularly Japanese Americans, as perpetual foreign threats who were

“ineligible to citizenship” and another project that sought to combat the colonial designation of Native Hawaiians as “unfit for self-government.”

While the statehood narrative has become memorialized as a triumph of multiracial coalitions united against white racism, the fact that Hawaiians and their supporters voiced opposition to statehood citing the 1893 overthrow remains underresearched in current scholarship and nearly all but forgotten in public discourse. This was in fact deliberate, as the Hawaii Statehood Commission, a state agency responsible for capturing hegemony and normalizing public opinion for statehood, actively suppressed Native Hawaiian opposition. Indeed, in complex ways, Hawai'i statehood, narrated as a liberal antiracist civil rights project, facilitated and normalized projects of both settler colonialism and empire. U.S. ambitions for global hegemony during the Cold War found a discursive alliance with selected narrations of Japanese American racial persecution and loyal military service, setting these narratives to public memory through global circulation, amusement, and publicity, while other narratives of Native Hawaiian colonial oppression were designated for historical deletion through intimidation and containment.

THE THREE PILLARS OF WHITE SUPREMACY

With each political project responding to its own unique location within changing conditions and overlapping formations of local and global power, certain analyses and insights of one racial project can help to illuminate blind spots or silences within the next. American Indian studies scholar Andrea Smith's conceptual frame that white supremacy is comprised of distinct but interrelated logics—labor exploitation, genocide (settler colonialism), and war (Orientalism)—provides a useful framework for centering relational thinking in comparative ethnic studies scholarship. Smith argues that dominant conceptions of coalition politics are framed around a shared victimization by white supremacy, often resulting in the “oppression olympics”—where groups issue competing narratives over who is more oppressed. Smith's intervention shows how different historical groups are not impacted by white supremacy uniformly and demonstrates how strategies for resistance are often themselves set by a system of white supremacy.¹³

While naming all the discursive logics of white supremacy is an elusive project, Smith's tactical assemblage of labor, genocide, and war helps to articulate an awareness of these overlapping yet nonequivalent forms of oppression, especially when liberal multiculturalism is pervasive in flattening the important historical and political differences between dissimilarly oppressed groups. The first logic of oppression she identifies is labor exploitation where Blackness is often equated with a certain "slaveability." A modification of this pillar for the specificities of Hawai'i's history can turn to numerous labor histories that have examined the production of a hierarchy of differently racialized ethnic groups in maintaining labor exploitation and its role in Hawai'i's militant unionism.¹⁴ The second pillar is genocide or settler colonialism through which indigenous peoples must "disappear" so that others can lay a claim over their land.

Genocide (whether through physical extermination or cultural assimilation)¹⁵ and its counterpart, settler colonialism, work hand in hand as a system of power that expropriates Native territories and eliminates Native modes of production in order to replace these seemingly primitive societies with settlers who are discursively constituted as superior, and thus more deserving over these contested lands and resources. This pillar is easily recognizable in the numerous Hawaiian histories tracing resistance to U.S. occupation, but also in recent scholarship in Asian American studies such as in Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura's anthology, *Asian Settler Colonialism*. Dylan Rodriguez's *Suspended Apocalypse* also relocates "Filipino American" subjectivities within a genealogy of white supremacist genocide and war.¹⁶

The last pillar, Orientalism or war, posits the need for a permanent foreign threat that allows the United States to be in a permanent state of war. Given Hawai'i's strategic military location in the middle of the Pacific, U.S. interests in Hawai'i have been largely dominated by the military.¹⁷ Whether it is the use of Hawai'i as a stopping point for U.S. soldiers involved in the Philippine-American war, Japanese in Hawai'i prior to and during World War II, the threat of Communists, or currently, in reference to so-called terrorists, numerous cultural representations have provided justification for the United States to fortify Hawai'i as a military outpost. Similarly, Orientalism translates into external and internal foreign threats, materializing in anti-immigration and naturalization laws that constitute

many of these groups as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”¹⁸ Andrea Smith’s conceptual frame thus allows one to analyze different systems of power in complex unity by questioning how power simultaneously targets and operates through each group to participate in different historically produced and politically mediated forms of hegemony. According to Smith: “This way, our alliances would not be solely based on shared victimization, but where we are complicit in the victimization of others.”¹⁹

FROM WHITE RACIAL DICTATORSHIP TO LIBERAL MULTICULTURAL EMPIRE

In his intricate study of Hawai‘i statehood, *Last among Equals*, Roger Bell shows how southern senators blocked Hawai‘i’s bid for statehood because they wanted to keep congressional control for the Democrats and also felt nervous that new liberal Asian American senators might facilitate the passing of civil rights legislation.²⁰ In *Completing the Union*, John S. Whitehead compares the movement for statehood in Hawai‘i and Alaska and their particular utility as military posts during the Cold War.²¹ It is at the intersection of civil rights and the Cold War that we can gain a more expansive view of the converging interests that produced Hawai‘i statehood. Various scholars examining the Cold War have shown how the idea of the United States as a racially diverse nation based on harmonious democratic relations was mobilized for the purposes of U.S. global hegemony.²² For instance, Derrick Bell argues that the celebrated *Brown v. Board of Education* Supreme Court decision, which desegregated public schools in 1954, cannot be understood without considering how it served the economic and political interests of whites in policy-making positions who understood its benefits at home and abroad. Bell thus argues that the *Brown* decision helped to provide “immediate credibility” in the Cold War to “win the hearts and minds of emerging third world people.”²³

By the 1950s and 1960s, when decolonization throughout Asia, Oceania, Africa, and Latin America was transforming the world order and criticism of Western imperialism was the dominant international sentiment, Cold War warriors were aware that Hawai‘i statehood had ideological value for gaining the allegiance of newly decolonized nations. In 1950, Edward L. Bernays, called by some the “father of public relations,” was a visiting professor at the University of Hawai‘i. Bernays had been

widely known for his corporate and political propaganda campaigns, some of which included targeting women in the 1920s as new consumers for cigarette smoking, and perhaps most notably for his public relations work for the United Fruit Company in the 1950s that led directly to the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala in 1954 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²⁴ While in Hawai‘i, Bernays argued for Hawai‘i statehood, stating that Hawai‘i’s citizenry—theorized as racially diverse but culturally American—should be showcased above all other American achievements for the world to see what only American democracy could accomplish. Bernays believed that Hawai‘i statehood would be beneficial both nationally and internationally to “dramatize” to Americans on the continent that diverse racial groups could in fact “live together in harmony,” while supporting American interests in the “Orient” by disproving Communist accusations that “imperialism and racism are our national policy.”²⁵ Hawai‘i’s majority Asian American and Pacific Islander population could thus serve as the new face of a militarily powerful and economically dominant United States—one that would ideologically assist the maintenance and establishment of U.S. military bases and secure access to resources and markets throughout Asia and the Pacific. In order to make Hawai‘i statehood more attractive in the eyes of Congress and the American public, proponents of statehood would begin to use Hawai‘i’s alterity to their favor. A diverse range of communities formed a historical bloc, including many Native Hawaiians, consenting to a presumably higher calling of U.S. nationality in order to demonstrate their merit through alternative versions of American modernity. Southern senators who had incessantly blocked statehood would come to view Hawai‘i and Alaska as “the frontiers of America’s new strategic position in the world.”²⁶ As Christina Klein cogently argues in *Cold War Orientalism*, Hawai‘i statehood had the ability to rearticulate U.S. imperialism as the spreading of democracy, which created a misleading distinction between European colonial powers and the United States.²⁷

While Hawai‘i statehood helped give American race relations a multicultural face before an international community, the local discourse of statehood in Hawai‘i furnished the Hawai‘i elite with the possibility of insulating, if not reconsolidating, their economic power that had been under threat.²⁸ Prior to World War II, a white settler elite worked to gain

statehood as a means of securing profitable tariffs for the sugar industry. By the end of the Second World War, however, statehood was desired by many to transition to and capitalize on a burgeoning tourism industry and postwar boom. As long as Hawai'i remained a territory and not a state, large U.S. banks and insurance companies were prohibited by their corporate indentures from issuing large loans or insurance policies. Malcolm MacNaughton, former president of both Castle & Cooke and the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, reflected on statehood in 1986: "We couldn't get this money. And air travel was increasing. Tourism was coming. . . . We needed this money. Statehood would get it for us."²⁹ This lack of investment capital inhibited businesses from managing and profiting from record numbers of tourists visiting the islands. The Hawaii Statehood Commission (1947–1959) was formed in this context to take over the statehood campaign from the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission (1935–1947) in order to lead a more aggressive movement for statehood.

The Hawaii Statehood Commission, like the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission before it, controlled and framed the rules of discourse for civil society surrounding statehood. Comprised of nine members who by law were required to be known supporters of statehood, the commission was authorized to disseminate information, correct misinformation, conduct national advertising and publicity campaigns, and routinely assist witnesses who appeared before congressional committees. Indeed, the Statehood Commission had intimate ties to the 1893 overthrow. Lorrin P. Thurston, eventual chair of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, was the son of Lorrin A. Thurston, who established the Hawaiian Bureau of Information, an agency created in 1892 that similarly used the press and publicity campaigns to shape public opinion surrounding the 1893 overthrow and gain public support for annexation. With two of the owners of the major newspapers in Hawai'i—the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin* and *Honolulu Advertiser*—on this commission, statehood proponents were able to flood Hawai'i newspapers calling for an "article a day in daily newspapers" to reinforce and normalize public opinion in support of statehood.³⁰ These newspapers also disciplined those who opposed statehood by running articles that sought to discredit them. Indeed, the Hawaii Statehood Commission would come into contact with more than 1,700 daily newspaper editors throughout the United States, and, as Roger Bell notes, in the first

decade the number of editorials that favored statehood grew from 500 to about 3,000 annually.³¹

“THEY’RE NOT JAPS. . . . THEY’RE JAPANESE-AMERICANS”

One of the biggest obstacles facing statehood proponents was that Hawai‘i contained a large population of Japanese Americans who were construed by an American Orientalist discourse as inscrutable foreign threats. In the decades leading to World War II, and punctuated by the December 7 attack in 1941, American national identity was informed by what Moon-Kie Jung terms “anti-Japanese Americanism.”³² Japanese Americans who were linked to a belligerent empire in Asia were racialized differently from other nonwhite groups in Hawai‘i. Jung explains: “anti-Japanese racism was not based on an assured belief that the Japanese were inferior but on a fear that they were *not*.”³³ After World War II, this idea that Japanese were not inferior would work to their benefit. Statehood proponents responded to questions of Japanese American loyalty by pointing to the military heroism and massive casualties and injuries sustained by the 100th Infantry Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Nicknamed the “Purple Heart Battalion,” the 100th Battalion and 442nd Regimental Combat Team received more than 18,143 decorations but also suffered an unusually high number of casualties and injuries at 9,486. Indeed, the high casualty and injury rates show how officers of the U.S. Army viewed Japanese American soldiers as expendable; even the soldiers themselves believed they were ordered on what were largely considered “suicide missions.”³⁴ At the onset of the war, many Japanese American men were designated 4C “enemy aliens,” a classification that not only made them ineligible for the draft but also cast further suspicion over their loyalty to the United States. After the war, however, with Japan pacified as a nonthreat and perceived as a new economic ally of the United States, key opportunities soon opened to transform prevailing perceptions of Japanese Americans as perpetual foreign threats.

In the postwar period, narrations of Japanese American loyalty and masculine sacrifice in World War II were popularized as a means to win statehood for Hawai‘i but also to reconcile two formidable empires—the United States and Japan. Historian Tom Coffman explains that Edwin O.

Reischauer, the principal architect of postwar U.S. relations with Japan (and eventual ambassador to Japan under John F. Kennedy), had argued in 1942 that the internment of Japanese Americans had “unwittingly contributed” to Japanese wartime propaganda. Such propaganda stated that Japan was fighting a war to stop the United States from spreading white supremacist domination throughout Asia. Reischauer wrote: “We should reverse this situation and make of these American citizens a major asset in our ideological war in Asia.”³⁵ As a result of President Truman’s decision to use atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with the later military occupation of Japan by the United States, Reischauer would highlight the need to celebrate with vigor the wartime heroics of the Japanese American veterans.

The 1951 MGM film *Go For Broke!* played one such role in challenging sentiments that the United States remained a white supremacist nation that restrained the civil rights of Japanese Americans.³⁶ The film first screened at the national Capitol on May 24, 1951, as well as internationally through much of Europe and Asia. Most prominently, however, the film screened in Japan on December 7, 1952, on the eleventh anniversary of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. In the film the heroism and valor of Japanese American soldiers are themselves deployed to rid the newly commissioned Second Lieutenant Grayson, played by Van Johnson, of his bigoted views of Japanese Americans. **From the start of the film, anti-Japanese racism is addressed through a series of pedagogical lessons on liberal racial tolerance.**³⁷

In order to portray the United States as a nation founded on democratic ideals, not white supremacy, the film needed to provide sufficient reasons why the United States interned 110,000 Japanese Americans. Grayson confides to his captain his belief that Japanese Americans remain dangerous when he asks if they use live ammunition at the rifle range, stating sarcastically that all he knew was that the Japanese were placed in “relocation centers” and maybe “the army just had some surplus barbed wire they wanted to use, was that it?”³⁸ The captain proceeds to admonish Lieutenant Grayson: “The army was facing an emergency at the start of the war—a possible invasion by Japanese troops. So all Japanese-Americans on the West Coast were evacuated as a precautionary measure. . . . I suggest you start getting acquainted.”³⁹ After fighting alongside the 442nd in

Italy and France, Grayson comes to respect his fellow soldiers. In a pivotal scene, which sets up the climactic rescue of the Texas Battalion by the *Nisei* soldiers, Grayson stands up for his Japanese American regiment to his unreformed racist friend Culley, who continually refers to the Japanese American soldiers as “Japs.” Embarrassed because some of the Japanese American soldiers overhear their conversation, Grayson asks Culley to step outside. Grayson lectures Culley, “They’re not Japs, Culley. They’re Japanese-Americans—Nisei—or, if you prefer, boodaheads [*sic*]. But not Japs. They don’t like it and neither do I.”⁴⁰ Grayson proceeds to scuffle with Culley, who eventually changes his views, but only after the 442nd and the 100th Battalion rescue the Texas Battalion.

Though white racism is repeatedly challenged throughout the film, white masculinity is simultaneously and continually reinforced. Japanese Americans are cinematically framed in the film in ways that highlight their short physical statures against the larger white American soldiers like Grayson. Such juxtapositions made Japanese Americans palatable to a white American audience by rendering them unthreatening to white heteropatriarchal order. In one particular montage, the soldiers are shown running through an obstacle course, but they are unable to leap over trenches or climb a wooden wall. Their inability to perform what “normal” soldiers are routinely able to do symbolically emasculates them. Racially different but nationally the same, the racial order of the United States would symbolically become more inclusive as a multicultural nation, yet continue to preserve notions of white supremacy. While Japanese American military sacrifice helped to mend U.S. relations with Japan, in Hawai‘i it also assisted both a movement for statehood and Japanese American ascendancy.

Japanese Americans represented a new political force that gave birth to a new arrangement of power in Hawai‘i. The emergence of various labor movements of plantation and dockworkers, changing demographics and their impact on voting, and the disenfranchisement of rights through martial law during World War II would alter Hawai‘i’s political landscape.⁴¹ Asians in Hawai‘i, indeed, had historical reason to agitate. Even previous to the 1900 Organic Act, when Hawai‘i adopted the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States, Asian groups were prohibited

from naturalization or voting by the 1887 Bayonet Constitution. This constitution, signed by King David Kalākaua under threat of force, also dramatically limited the influence of the monarch while disenfranchising a majority of Hawaiians from voting through income, property, and literacy requirements. Labeled “ineligible to citizenship” with the passing of racist American laws, this first generation would have to wait for their children to come of voting age to gain political representation. In 1936, Romanzo Adams, a University of Hawai‘i sociologist and proponent of the “immigration assimilation model,” predicted that by 1944 two-thirds of Hawai‘i’s Asian population would be able to vote, consequently increasing the strength of the “non-caucasian majority” and leading to a redistribution of power.⁴² Realizing that a previously closed window of political opportunity was poised to open, many Asian Americans helped revitalize the Democratic Party to challenge the Republican Party’s control over the territorial legislature. Ronald Takaki notes that Japanese American struggles against the *haole* oligarchy reflected a new consciousness, “a transformation from sojourners to settlers, from Japanese to Japanese Americans.”⁴³ By 1952, Congress passed the Walter-McCarren Act, making it possible for the first-generation Japanese to naturalize and vote; by 1954, Japanese Americans were the largest voting bloc in the territory, and the Democratic Party, with the support of the International Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU), dislodged the Republican plantation oligarchy from the legislature in what has been termed in Hawai‘i as the “Democratic Revolution.”

Matsuo Takabuki, 442nd veteran, major player in land development, and a once controversial trustee of the Bishop Estate, writes that prior to the “Democratic Revolution” Japanese Americans and Chinese Americans participated in creating a “financial revolution.”⁴⁴ After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many white businessmen left Hawai‘i fearing further military attack and martial law.⁴⁵ This consequently led to an economic vacuum, enabling many Japanese American and Chinese American entrepreneurs to capitalize on abandoned businesses and wide open markets. Takabuki writes: “The Fukunagas of Servco started a small garage in Haleiwa, which grew into a large conglomerate of auto and durable goods dealerships, discount stores, and financial institutions. . . . The Teruyas’ small restaurant

and market in the 1950s and 1960s eventually became Times Supermarket. Chinn Ho started Capital Investment. K. J. Luke and Clarence Ching created Loyalty Enterprises, while Aloha Airlines began with Ruddy Tongg. As the number of local professionals, lawyers, and doctors grew in postwar Hawai‘i, the economic, professional, and political landscape also changed rapidly.”⁴⁶

Takabuki explains further that the major banks in Hawai‘i—Bank of Hawai‘i and Bishop Bank (now First Hawaiian Bank)—would not regularly offer business loans to anyone outside of the white economic circle. This led veterans Daniel Inouye and Sakae Takahashi to join in opening two banks: Central Pacific Bank (CPB) and later the City Bank of Honolulu.⁴⁷ With financial and administrative support from major banking institutions in Japan, many in the Democratic Party ventured in major residential and tourism-related real estate development projects since tourism had displaced agriculture as the dominant industry in the 1960s.

To be sure, during the territorial period, a complex transition between a white racial dictatorship and a liberal “multicultural” state emerged.⁴⁸ Ronald Takaki argues that Asian Americans in Hawai‘i “by their numerical preponderance . . . had greater opportunities [than in the continental United States] to weave themselves and their cultures into the very fabric of Hawaii and to seek to transform their adopted land into a society of rich diversity where they and their children would no longer be ‘strangers from a different shore.’”⁴⁹ Roger Bell, on the other hand, notes that Native Hawaiians, after statehood, “had become . . . *strangers*, in their own land, submerged beneath the powerful white minority and a newly assertive Asian majority.”⁵⁰ In spite of a movement for genuine equality, the counterhegemonic strategies of Asian Americans against *haole* supremacy challenged, modified, and yet renewed a hegemonic U.S. colonial system. Major land development projects, particularly in hotels and shopping centers, slowed down, however, because of the aforementioned fear or lack of confidence by stateside lenders and insurers in Hawai‘i’s territorial economy. This motivated many Japanese Americans to push for statehood, alongside those on the other end of the political spectrum who were a part of or associated with the “Big Five” companies that dominated Hawai‘i’s economy. Such an emerging historical bloc and discursive alliance did not,

however, go unnoticed or unchallenged by others. During the war and after it, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell emerged as a leading opponent of statehood, publicly opposing the statehood movement while fighting for other forms of self-governance for Hawaiians.

“SOMETHING INDEFINABLE WOULD BE LOST”

More than any other public figure in the 1940s, Alice Kamokilaikawai Campbell was a public spokesperson for the suppressed voices of Hawaiian opposition to statehood. Kamokila, as she was commonly known, was the daughter of sugar planter James Campbell, which afforded her the economic means to speak against statehood in ways that most other Hawaiians who had been dependent on the government or the Big Five companies for work could not. Kamokila’s mother, Abigail Ku’aihelani, was a key leader in organizing the 1897 Kū‘ē petitions against U.S. annexation—signed by more than 90 percent of the Hawaiian population throughout the islands opposed to imposed American citizenship.⁵¹ In fact, Kamokila was informed by a long matrilineal genealogy of Hawaiian resistance. Elected as a territorial senator from Maui County, Kamokila publicized her campaign by running a radio advertisement that spoke of the overthrow of Queen Lili‘uokalani.⁵² Kamokila thus challenged colonial assumptions that Hawaiians, particularly Hawaiian women, were incapable of self-government.

Kamokila maintained that with the attainment of statehood, “something indefinable would be lost,” and therefore throughout her political career she strove to achieve some form of self-governance, besides statehood, for Native Hawaiians.⁵³ In fact, Kamokila sought out other peoples whose American citizenship was forced upon them by the United States, namely Native Americans and other Pacific Islanders. For instance, after being elected to the territorial senate, Kamokila traveled to Washington, D.C., to obtain information on the potential of turning Hawaiian Home Lands as defined by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act into a kind of Native American reservation to be administered through the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Kamokila was asked by her Hawaiian constituents to investigate the Native American reservation system as an “alternative

proposal to the present set up,” arguing that the government had been negligent in placing Hawaiians on the land. While in Washington, D.C., Kamokila was able to hold meetings with influential and powerful elected officials, such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, and several senators, to discuss the possibility of placing Hawaiian Home Lands under the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Kamokila explained, however, that it was her discussions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs that made her “more and more drawn away” from the proposal and that she would seek alternative means of “correcting faults” in the commission.⁵⁴ In October 1944, still seeking to combat the political and economic oppression of Native Hawaiians, Kamokila committed what many considered to be political suicide. She sought Congressman Sterling Cole of New York to sponsor a bill that would transfer Hawai‘i from the Department of the Interior to the naval department. After visits to Guam and Samoa, Kamokila reasoned that because Hawaiians were unable to control immigration into Hawai‘i, naval control would actually limit the flow of immigration (as it had in Guam) and prohibit nonnatives from owning land (as it did in American Samoa).

In January 1946, when the first congressional hearings on statehood since World War II were held at ‘Iolani Palace, Kamokila would bring the issues of Hawaiian self-government, Big Five economic greed, and the numerical dominance of Japanese Americans to bear against statehood. Aware that her testimony would be one of the few in opposition to statehood, the Hawaii Equal Rights Commission attempted to squeeze her into an afternoon with other witnesses. Kamokila skillfully forced the committee to provide a full day of testimony for her alone, stating that she needed more time for her graphs and charts to be prepared.⁵⁵ In fact, her testimony was much anticipated in Hawai‘i: earlier in the month, Kamokila had publicly withdrawn from the Democratic Party as a result of its endorsement of statehood.⁵⁶ She deliberately managed to get her testimony scheduled on January 17, on the fifty-third anniversary of the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom. By skillful maneuver, Kamokila used this historic date to force a history of national dispossession of Native Hawaiians in conversation with the economic gains many believed would occur through statehood. Kamokila also knew that such an explicitly stated connection could mark her as “un-American” and invalidate her testimony.

On the day of her testimony, Kamokila chose to wear a black *holoku* gown with red and yellow *lei* and spoke for more than two hours to thunderous applause in front of a packed room of more than 600. Kamokila charged the Big Five companies with orchestrating the statehood movement as a means to advance their economic interests by attracting “outside capital and independent financial giants.” Striking at the heart of the business community’s desires for statehood, Kamokila declared: “I do not feel . . . that we should forfeit the traditional rights and privileges of the natives of our islands for a mere thimbleful of votes in Congress, that we, the lovers of Hawaii from long association with it, should sacrifice our birthright for the greed of alien desires to remain on our shores, that we should satisfy the thirst for power and control of some inflated industrialists and politicians.”⁵⁷

In her testimony, Kamokila also called attention to the links between Big Five economic domination and the fear and silence that many felt in opposing statehood. She shared an example of one such sentiment, sent to her in private, that implored her to speak on behalf of those who could not: “We can’t, Kamokila. My husband would lose his job.” Those present at the testimony, however, were able to express their sentiments collectively in their cheers and applause after her comments. For instance, large applause was heard after Kamokila’s response to Representative Homer Angell’s question that asked why statehood would not be able to address the problems she cited in the territorial structure. Kamokila responded with a thinly veiled reference to the 1893 overthrow: “Who is it that has put us in the position we are today but the people who are asking you for statehood?” When asked by the congressmen what kind of government she would want instead of statehood, Kamokila responded, “an independent form of government,” and then explained that if others wanted to live in a U.S. state, they could simply move to any of the forty-eight states in the nation.

Kamokila, however, also criticized the numerical dominance of Japanese Americans in racist terms. She implied that Japanese Americans aided the attack on Pearl Harbor and that their move from the plantations to small businesses could cause Japanese to “get a hold on the islands.” Kamokila’s statements reinforced the racist exclusion that Japanese Americans had long sought to counter. At the same time, her remarks against

Japanese Americans should not be taken as an invalidation of her aims to seek justice for Hawaiians for the overthrow of their nation. Kamokila had been arguing all along that statehood, especially as it was backed by a push for Japanese American ascendancy, was a continuation of Big Five hegemony.⁵⁸ Kamokila's anti-Japanese statements must thus be read against the backdrop of widespread circulation of heroic narratives about Japanese American loyalty during and soon after World War II, which facilitated U.S. imperial ambitions by strengthening the statehood movement. Such narrations actively obscured specific claims by Native Hawaiians beneath a domestic U.S. civil rights discourse and a peculiarly Asian American exceptionalist narrative. This exceptionalist framing that evolved into a discourse of Japanese Americans being distinct from whites but excellent at mastering assimilation and success in U.S. society, unlike Native Hawaiians, reaffirmed the United States as an exceptionalist nation-state devoid of both debilitating racism and settler colonialism. It also made it difficult for others to oppose statehood without being labeled racist against Japanese Americans.

What has been less visible to many, if not rendered natural and normal, is how Asian projects for equality with white settlers and inclusion into the United States have actually helped form political projects and identities in opposition to or at the expense of those Native Hawaiians seeking self-government. For instance, on April 9, 1893, a little more than two months after the U.S.-backed overthrow, Japanese plantation laborers submitted a petition that did not oppose the overthrow of Hawai'i but rather demanded their electoral participation in the new settler government, stating that they were the "physical and intellectual" equals of any of the other foreigners.⁵⁹ Likewise in 1894, Chinese in Hawai'i sent a petition, signed by hundreds of people, also seeking their right to participate in the new settler government.⁶⁰ Virgilio Menor Felipe writes that the term "Kanaka," which usually means Hawaiian, was used as a slur by Filipinos to also mean "'boy' or servant."⁶¹ Furthermore, in a study conducted in the 1950s, Joseph C. Finney argued that the "primitive stereotype" defined common views of Hawaiians as "lazy." As one woman listed as Japanese said: "You see the Hawaiians are . . . popularly known to be lazy, and they don't have a tradition for literacy and they're not the conscientious type,

industrious type.”⁶² This is itself an old tale of capitalism wherein Marx takes Adam Smith to task for creating a “nursery tale” about two sorts of people, “one, the diligent, intelligent and above all frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living.” Marx goes on to argue that “in actual history, it is a notorious fact that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part.”⁶³

It is here that Andrea Smith’s conceptual framing of labor exploitation, genocide, and war can help us understand how efforts to combat one’s own form of oppression can lead unwittingly to participating in the oppressive logic of another.⁶⁴ Japanese Americans and their supporters challenged the view that they were perpetual foreign threats vis-à-vis cultural narratives of civil rights that anchored the Hawai’i statehood campaign and forged deeply by the histories of Japanese American persecution and later desires to capitalize on land developments in the postwar period. These cultural narratives, however, render invisible their role in maintaining and renewing hegemonic forms of settler colonialism and occupation. Smith’s framework further helps us also understand Kamokila’s predicament: in combating the notion that Hawaiians were destined to disappear and thus be replaced, she resisted this by heightening fear that Japanese Americans were foreign threats “ineligible to citizenship.” In fact, evidence exists to suggest that her statements were part of a strategy to gain political leverage to oppose statehood by purposely aligning with the conservative Right. Only two years earlier, Kamokila had in fact publicly opposed anti-Japanese racism, arguing that those “whose heart and mind are set against statehood for reasons based on prejudice, rather than ideals, those are the people of Hawaii who should be pitied rather than condemned.”⁶⁵ In hoping to prevent the latest elaboration of U.S. occupation through the vehicle of statehood, however, Kamokila appealed to a long and well-established fear among many white Americans that Japanese Americans were perpetual foreign threats; such appeals would work against her aims.

A few days after her testimony, Kamokila told the press that she had been asked to launch an island-wide petition to oppose statehood. This was a similar action, as previously mentioned, to what her mother, Abigail Ku’aihelani, had helped accomplish when she and others toured the islands in 1897 with the Kū’ē petitions to oppose U.S. annexation. This new peti-

tion, however, would not circulate because of the risk of providing the Big Five companies with a list of names that could be immediately used to “blacklist.”⁶⁶ In September 1947, Kamokila continued her opposition to statehood by opening the Anti-Statehood Clearing House. This clearinghouse was designed to counter the Hawaii Statehood Commission by collecting testimony in opposition to statehood that could be used to lobby Congress against statehood. Using her contacts made on her visits to Washington, D.C., Kamokila sent “anti-statehood information, reports and arguments to congress.”⁶⁷ This, in fact, gives more credence to the explanation of John A. Burns in 1960, congressional delegate (1957–1959) and governor of Hawai‘i (1962–1974), about the effectiveness of local opposition to statehood in Hawai‘i: “The reasons why Hawaii did not achieve statehood, say, ten years ago—and one could without much exaggeration say sixty years ago—lie not in the Congress but in Hawaii. . . . For the most part it has remained under cover and has marched under other banners. Such opposition could not afford to disclose itself, since it was so decidedly against the interests and desires of Hawaii’s people generally.”⁶⁸ One year later Kamokila struck a major blow to the Hawaii Statehood Commission by revealing its campaign to be a predetermined and deliberately used agency to silence any opposition to statehood.

On January 17, 1948, on the fifty-fifth anniversary of the overthrow, Kamokila filed a lawsuit in *Campbell v. Stainback et al.* that challenged the legality of the financing of the Hawaii Statehood Commission. In the suit, Kamokila charged that the \$200,000 used by the territorial government to campaign nationally and locally for statehood were not validly used as public funds since they were spent for purely political aims.⁶⁹ In March 1949, Justice E. C. Peters ordered an injunction against the Statehood Commission that prohibited the use of public monies for a national campaign. Justice Peters argued: “To accord validity to expenditures for an indiscriminate publicity campaign upon the ground that it is for a public purpose would do violence to that term . . . and dignify as ‘public’ what obviously is purely ‘political.’”⁷⁰ Though the court found that the territory could not “petition the public” in favor of statehood, it did not, more fundamentally, go so far as to declare the commission invalid, and in fact left room for “reasonable” expenditures for the Statehood Commission to promote statehood.

In 1953, Kamokila wrote a letter to Congress arguing that of the \$475,000 that had been appropriated for the statehood campaign since 1947, no money had been apportioned to opponents of statehood. Kamokila by then had begun to campaign for commonwealth status for Hawai‘i and admitted that while the majority of people in Hawai‘i were in favor of statehood, this was the only option being discussed: “So much has been said and published favoring Statehood for Hawaii that it is only fair that the opposition be heard. Unfortunately, equal treatment under law is denied the opponents of Statehood.”⁷¹ To be sure, the Statehood Commission in 1949 had “roundly denounced” a plan by Papakōlea Hawaiian Homesteaders to write a letter to Senator Hugh Butler opposing statehood. Homesteaders explained that they were visited by a member of the Statehood Commission who made them “afraid to make the written statement.”⁷² In 1957, the Hawaii Statehood Commission determined strategies to counter taxi drivers and tour guides who were telling tourists that statehood was not desired by Hawaiians.⁷³ While the views of proponents of statehood were expressed openly and repeatedly in the public, the actions of Kamokila and others operated in a climate of fear. If in fact a democracy relies on an educated populace, by 1959 Hawai‘i residents were deliberately only educated about the benefits of statehood. Such deliberate containment of Hawai‘i’s options for political status, combined with a highly partial opinion campaign to secure support for statehood, speaks volumes about the actual status of democracy in Hawai‘i.

As a part of its yearlong plans to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of Hawai‘i statehood, the current Statehood Commission ran a series of television and radio vignettes, called “50 Voices of Statehood,” designed to educate the public about different perspectives of Hawai‘i statehood.⁷⁴ One such public service announcement featured Rev. Abraham Akaka’s 1959 sermon, which was delivered at Kawaiaha‘o church on March 13, 1959, the day after the statehood bill was passed. In this vignette, U.S. senator Daniel Akaka describes his older brother’s sermon as a celebration of both statehood and the aloha spirit and gives the impression that the largely Hawaiian church was uniformly supportive of statehood. While the sermon did celebrate statehood as an achievement, Rev. Akaka’s sermon also acknowledges the existence of Hawaiian opposition to statehood,

an antagonism premised on America's desecration of Native sacred sites and a government "motivated by economic greed": "There are some of us to whom statehood brings great hopes, and there are those to whom statehood brings *silent fears*. . . . There are fears that Hawai'i as a state will be motivated by economic greed; that statehood will turn Hawai'i (as someone has said) into a great big spiritual junkyard filled with smashed dreams, worn out illusions; that will make the Hawaiian people lonely, confused, insecure, empty, anxious" [emphasis added].⁷⁵ Indeed, in the post-statehood era, Rev. Abraham Akaka was one of many who opposed the appointment of the aforementioned Matsuo Takabuki to Bishop Estate trustee, citing his connections to the Democratic Party and penchant for politics in the service of land and power. After Takabuki's confirmation, Rev. Akaka rang the bells at Kawaiaha'o Church for an hour in protest stating: "We are now a nobody as far as the government is concerned."⁷⁶

Through a critical reconsideration of the ways that state agencies framed the rules of discourse to normalize the U.S. occupation of Hawai'i, we are better able to understand how Hawai'i statehood became expected, how it came to be considered an inevitable outcome of history, **and how ideas about history and race were arranged so as to invalidate and silence opposition to statehood.** These stories of American egalitarianism, besides silencing Hawaiian opposition, obscure how desires for capital expansion largely underpinned elite desires for statehood. Thus, contemporary Hawaiian demonstrations on Admission Day challenge the state's narration of itself and, in so doing, also illuminate how the state's present power was taken historically by illegal force and at the expense of Hawaiian rights to self-determination. Both Japanese Americans and Native Hawaiians were contending with very different histories and political possibilities shaped by both U.S. foreign policy and the needs of a rapidly growing tourism industry. Within an ever-growing system reliant on imperial accumulation and Native dispossession since its very inception, American liberation and exploitation are two sides of the same coin. Perhaps until we become multilingual in each other's histories, we will continue to renew a system of imperial violence and capitalist exploitation.

Notes

1. Diana Leone, "Statehood Celebration at Palace Gets Heated," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, August 19, 2006.
2. At a statehood celebration held at the open-air rotunda at the state capitol on March 18, 2009, the Hawaiian Independence Action Alliance (HIAA), a coalition comprised of more than ten different Hawaiian groups, organized a peaceful demonstration to draw attention to statehood's more obscured history. With tall red and black banners fastened to bamboo poles that read "HAWAIIAN INDEPENDENCE" and with each participant wearing a single bright green letter on black T-shirts, the group spelled out the phrases "FAKE STATE" and "HISTORY OF THEFT" to critically link the celebration of Hawai'i statehood to a history of U.S. occupation and imperialism in the islands.
3. Peter Sur, "Group to Protest Strykers," *Hawaii Tribune-Herald*, November 9, 2009; "Uranium Revelation Upsets Isle Activists," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 6, 2006.
4. Mark Niesse, "Peaceful Protests Greet Admission Day," *Honolulu-Star Bulletin*, August 21, 2009.
5. U.S. Public Law 103–150, commonly known as the "Apology Bill," was passed on November 23, 1993. It stated that "Congress apologizes to Native Hawaiians on behalf of the people of the United States for the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii on January 17, 1893 with the participation of agents and citizens of the United States, and the deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination."
6. Genetically modified organisms are organisms whose genes are modified by combining the DNA from other species. Furthermore, genetic testing on *Hāloa*, a kind of taro that is the sibling of Hawaiian people in origin stories, has caused many to oppose these multinational corporations.
7. Some Hawaiians argue that they are not "homeless" but rather are "homeless," since Hawai'i is their home.
8. Andrew Walden, "No Freedom to Celebrate Statehood," August 29, 2006, frontpagemag.com; Kenneth R. Conklin, "Hawaii Statehood—A Brief History of the Struggle to Achieve Statehood, and Current Challenges," www.angelfire.com/hi2/hawaiiansovereignty/statehoodhistancurr.html.
9. Ali Behdad, *A Forgetful Nation: On Immigration and Cultural Identity in the United States* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), 4–5.
10. Secretary of Hawaii, "Results of Votes Cast (Three Propositions) Held 27 June 1959," Hawai'i State Archives, Honolulu.
11. Mililani Trask, "Hawai'i and the United Nations," in *Asian Settler Colonialism: From Local Governance to the Habits of Everyday Life in Hawai'i*, ed. Candace Fujikane and Jonathan Y. Okamura, 68–70 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008).
12. Pat Gee, "Hawaii Diversity Applauded at Statehood Celebration," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, March 19, 2009.

13. Andrea Smith, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy: Rethinking Women of Color Organizing," in *Color of Violence: The INCITE! Anthology* (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2006), 66–67.
14. Ronald Takaki, *Pau Hana: Plantation Life and Labor in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984); Gary Okihiro, *Cane Fires: The Anti-Japanese Movement in Hawaii, (1865–1945)* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); Edward D. Beechert, *Working in Hawaii: A Labor History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985); Moon-Kie Jung, *Reworking Race: The Making of Hawaii's Interracial Labor Movement* (New York: Columbia University, 2006).
15. See Dylan Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse: White Supremacy, Genocide, and the Filipino Condition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 190–217; Patrick Wolfe, "Structure and Event: Settler Colonialism, Time, and the Question of Genocide," in *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History*, ed. A. Dirk Moses, 102–132 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008).
16. Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa, *Native Land and Foreign Desires: Pehea La E Pono Ai?* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1992); Jonathan Kamakawiwo'ole Osorio, *Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2002); Noenoe K. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004); J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, *Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of Sovereignty and Indigeneity* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008); Ty Kawika Tengan, *Native Men Remade: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Hawai'i* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008); Sally Engle Merry, *Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of Law* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Fujikane and Okamura, *Asian Settler Colonialism*; Rodriguez, *Suspended Apocalypse*.
17. See Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Kathy E. Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, *Oh, Say, Can You See? The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai'i* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
18. Keith Aoki, "No Right To Own? The Early Twentieth-Century 'Alien Land Laws' as a Prelude to Internment," 40 *B.C.L. Rev.* 37 (1998).
19. Smith, "Three Pillars of White Supremacy," 69.
20. Roger Bell, *Last among Equals: Hawaiian Statehood and American Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1984).
21. John S. Whitehead, *Completing the Union: Alaska, Hawai'i, and the Battle for Statehood* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004).
22. Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anti-colonialism, 1937–1957* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Thomas Borstelman, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold*

- War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Nikhil Pal Singh, "Culture/Wars: Recoding Empire in an Age of Democracy," *American Quarterly* 50 (1998): 471-522; Derrick A. Bell Jr., *Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
23. Derrick A. Bell Jr., "Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma," in *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement*, ed. by Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller, and Kendall Thomas, 22-23 (New York: New Press, 1995).
 24. See Larry Tye, *The Father of Spin: Edward L. Bernays and the Birth of Public Relations* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998), 23-50, 155-184.
 25. Edward L. Bernays, "HAWAII—The Almost Perfect State?" *New Leader*, November 20, 1950.
 26. Interview with John S. Whitehead in *Perspectives on Hawai'i's Statehood* (Honolulu: Oral History Project, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa, 1986), 27.
 27. Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1944-1961* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 250-251.
 28. Walter Dillingham was an incredibly powerful and influential member of the white elite who amassed large capital through his dredging and construction work under military and government contracts. Dillingham and others were opposed to statehood primarily because their connections in Washington, D.C., allowed them to benefit from the structure of the territorial government and their concerns that statehood would attract competition by bringing wealthier settlers to the islands.
 29. Interview with Malcolm McNaughton in *Perspectives on Hawai'i's Statehood*, 52-53.
 30. Lorrin P. Thurston and the *Honolulu Advertiser* often expressed ambivalence for statehood as a result of a militant labor movement. See Bell, *Last among Equals*, 169-170; Summary Report of Public Relations Activities, Executive Office, Citizens' Statehood Committee, 1 August 1946, Hawai'i State Archives.
 31. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 124.
 32. Jung, *Reworking Race*, 98-105.
 33. *Ibid.*, 82.
 34. Roland Kotani, *The Japanese in Hawaii: A Century of Struggle* (Honolulu: Hawaii Hochi, 1985), 115.
 35. Tom Coffman, *The Island Edge of America: A Political History of Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 84-87.
 36. Bosley Crowther, "The Screen in Review; 'Go for Broke!' Tribute to War Record of Nisei Regiment Opens at the Capitol," *New York Times*, May 25, 1951.

37. For an in-depth reading of this film, see T. Fujitani, "Go For Broke, the Movie: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses," in *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 2001).
38. Robert Pirosh, *Go For Broke!* movie script, University of Hawai'i Hamilton Library Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, 7.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., 89.
41. J. Garner Anthony, *Hawaii under Army Rule* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1955).
42. Romanzo C. Adams, *The Peoples of Hawaii* (Honolulu: American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1935).
43. Ronald Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore* (New York: Back Bay Books, 1998), 171.
44. Matsuo Takabuki, assisted by Dennis M. Ogawa, Glen Grant, and Wilma Sur, *An Unlikely Revolutionary: Matsuo Takabuki and the Making of Modern Hawai'i* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1998), 79.
45. Ibid., 65–66.
46. Ibid., 65.
47. Ibid., 81.
48. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 67–68.
49. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore*, 176.
50. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 293.
51. Silva, *Aloha Betrayed*, 130, 133, 148, 150, 161, 194.
52. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen, "The Incomparable Kamokila: Kathleen Mellen Recalls Mrs. Campbell's Greatest Coup d'état: She Blitzed the Election on Maui," *Paradise of the Pacific*, July 1962, 12.
53. Bell, *Last among Equals*, 116.
54. "Maui Woman Senator, at Washington, Sees Flaws in 'Reservation System,'" *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, June 17, 1943.
55. John S. Whitehead, "The Anti-Statehood Movement and the Legacy of Alice Kamokila Campbell," *Hawaiian Journal of History* 27 (1993): 49–50.
56. "Alice Campbell Resigns from Democrats," *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 6, 1946; "Senator Campbell Resigns as Democrat; Opposes Statehood," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 7, 1946.
57. "Text of Kamokila's Testimony: Senator Discusses Objections in Detail; Cites Racial Issues," *Honolulu Advertiser*, January 17, 1946.
58. Takabuki, *Unlikely Revolutionary*, 64.
59. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen (1895–1969), MS 19, Bishop Museum Archives, Honolulu, Hawai'i.
60. "A Petition signed by several hundred Chinese will be presented to the Councils today, asking that the Chinese in Hawaii be given the voting franchise," *Pacific Commercial Advertiser*, May 17, 1894.

61. Virgilio Menor Felipe, *Hawai'i: A Pilipino Dream* (Honolulu: Mutual Publishing, 2002), 198.
62. Joseph C. Finney, "Attitudes of Others Toward Hawaiians," 79, Hawaiian and Pacific Collection, University of Hawai'i at M noa; see also Tengan, *Native Men Remade*, 45.
63. Karl Marx, *Capital* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1990), 873–874.
64. Smith, "Heteropatriarchy and the Three Pillars of White Supremacy," 66–67.
65. "Senator Campbell Is Not a Candidate for Delegate, She Says," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, September 4, 1944.
66. "Kamokila in Die Hard Fight against Hawaii," *Maui News*, January 23, 1946; "Editorial: Beware of What You Sign," *Maui News*, January 26, 1946.
67. *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, September 18, 1947.
68. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 44.
69. "Public Funds Misused, Says Kamokila," *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 17, 1948.
70. "Decision on Statehood Case Fund Reversed," *Honolulu Advertiser*, March 29, 1948; "Opinion of the Court," *Campbell v. Stainback et al.*, 315.
71. Hawaii Statehood Commission, Honolulu Office General Records, Tavares, N.C.–Campbell, Kamokila, 1953, Hawai'i State Archives.
72. Kathleen Dickenson Mellen to Senator Hugh Butler, February 27, 1949, Box 97, "Confidential Letters," Nebraska National Historical Society, Lincoln.
73. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 46.
74. 50th Anniversary of Statehood Commission, "Statehood Commission Announces Plans for 50th Anniversary Commemoration Activities: Special Focus Placed on Educational Programs," press release, August 13, 2008, <http://hawaii.gov/gov/news/releases/2008/statehood-commission-announces-plans-for-50th>.
75. Whitehead, "Anti-Statehood Movement," 54–55.
76. Samuel P. King and Randall W. Roth, *Broken Trust: Greed, Mismanagement & Political Manipulation at America's Largest Charitable Trust* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 67.